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BOOK REVIEWS
Law and Peace in International Relations. The Oliver Wendell
Holmes Lectures for 1940-1941. By Hans Kelsen. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press. 1942. Pp. xi, 191. $2.00.
This volume includes six lectures by Hans Kelsen delivered in
memory of Mr. Justice Holmes at Harvard Law School in March,
1941. This first comprehensive study published by Hans Kelsen in
this country contains a convenient distillation of many of his former
studies, somewhat reshaped and amplified by current events and by
his most recent research. It is regrettable that we are still lacking
English translations of Kelsen's principal works; however, through the
efforts of the Association of American Law Schools these translations
are in progress. The student of legal theory and of international law
will find Law and Peace an engagingly provocative discussion of Kelsen's "pure theory of law" as it is related to the international horizon.
In addition, the study contains two penetrating essays on the political
problem of reshaping that social technique, generally referred to as law,
to make it an effective instrument for the peaceful collaboration of
nations.
Hans Kelsen's teaching has been characterized from the outset of
his career by his effort to establish an all-comprehensive legal epistemology. He has particularly attempted to determine clear-cut criteria to
distinguish legal systems and legal rules from other social rule systems
and rules of human behavior. For the sake of a complete architectonic
structure of his doctrine he sometimes applies propositions which seem
to be bold and somewhat strained. But even those somewhat strained
links of his doctrine are most instructive. Like that genius of legal
speculation of the nineteenth century, John Austin, Kelsen directs a considerable section 'of his polemic against what he calls the "traditional"
tloctrine, even though the substance and boundaries of traditional
legal theory have become gradually more and more indiscernible. In
former years some aristocrats of jurisprudence and lesser authorities
passed glacial judgments on Kelsen's "heresy." However, more and
more in the last two decades foremost publicists have found his inspiring crusades and -doctrines invaluable for the development of legal
theory and international law. There is today little doubt that among
contemporary jurists Kelsen has few peers and no superior.
The first four lectures are concerned with the framework of a
theory of international law. Because such a theory presupposes an
investigation of what law in general is, Kelsen indicates the elements
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of a universal concept of law. Indeed, he attempts to describe legal
systems and legal rules in an all-comprehensive proposition, btoad
enough to include both the so-called law of ancient Babylon and the
modern law of Switzerland and the United States. From the essential
elements of his concept of law he elevates one element as a decisive
criterion; he regards this specific element as distinguishing law as a
social technique from all other social rule systems known in human
history. And because, in his opinion, international law as a social rule
system possesses that decisive element, he includes international law in
his universal concept of law. What are the essential elements of Kelsen's legal concept? Law is a specific social technique, consisting of
legal rules, which either are originally formulated as hypothetical judgments or which may be transformed by a logical operation into hypothetical judgments. A hypothetical judgment states, "that under
certain conditions a certain measure of coercion (sanction) is to interThe rule of law, the term used in the descriptive sense, is a
vene ....
hypothetical judgment in which certain -definite consequences are attached to certain definite conditions" (p. 20). The law, according to
Kelsen, implies two fundamental facts, delict being one, and sanction the
other. "To connect them as condition and consequence is the fundamental function of the law" (p. 26). Kelsen implies that a legal rule
system binds an aggregate of people into a social community by regulating human social conduct (pp. 18, 75, 87). The existence of certain
organs (p. 59), a monopoly of the use of force for the community
(p. 56), and the intention to regulate in principle at least all human
relations (p. 71) are further essential elements of law. It is essential
to law that individuals must not be subordinated to men, but to rules,
i.e., not to the lawmaker but to laws made by him under the authority
of a constitution. "Non sub homine sed sub lege is the principle not
only of a democratic but of any legal order" (p. 66). "A common
condition of all sanctions stated in a rule of law is that the norm attaching a certain sanction to a certain delict has been created by a constitutional procedure" (p. 22). Professor Kelsen recognizes that the purpose
of law lies beyond the limits of its substance (pp. 23-24), and he regards
the promotion of peace as essentially inherent in a legal order (Introduction). Although juristic thinking takes into account only the validity
of the law (as contrasted to its efficacy), "the validity of the law presupposes a minimum efficacy of the law" (p. 16). That essential
criterion of law, which distinguishes it from all other social rule systems,
is its coerciveness, i.e., its attempt "to bring about the desired conduct
of individuals by the enactment of sanctions" (p. 7).
Kelsen bases his definition of the concept of law on the usual mean-
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ing of the word. And although he admits that narrower concepts may
exist, limited to certain time periods or to certain geographical regions
or taking as their basis certain political doctrines, he believes that the
extent of his concept transcends all these boundaries and "coincides by
and large with the common usage" (p. 4). He calls his concept the
static concept of law, as contrasted with dynamic concepts, which are
based on legal -definitions of law as enacted in positive constitutions
(p. 16). Thus, in the opinion of Kelsen, there is a common usage in
regard to the concept of law, because the decisive criterion, coerciveness,
has been a common element of all social orders called law over all ages,
over all geographic regions, and in all political doctrines. Naturally,
one may object that though common usage accepts potential coerciveness
as an essential element of law, there are other decisive elements, whose
presence or absence determines whether common usage accepts a social
rule system as law. One may even question whether there is common
usage (in the universal sense suggested by Kelsen) in regard to the
concept of law.
It is widely accepted that the concept of law and the concept of
state exist collaterally, one being necessary to the other; in this conception there is no place for extra-statal law. Kelsen, though viewing
statal law as the most developed law, recognizes as well two types of
extra-statal law, pre-statal law and super-statal law. Pre-statal law is
the law regulating individual relationships of primitive communities
which have not yet attained centralization of the law-making process
and of the execution of legal rules-two elements essential to Kelsen's
concept of state. Super-statal law, regulating the relationship between
states, also lacks these two essential elements. Kelsen designates prestatal law and super-statal law as law, but in an embryonic stage. And
because he assumes that an "embryo in a woman's womb is from the
beginning a human being," he calls "law in statu nascendi" law in the
real sense (p. 51). He finds the difference between primitive (preand super-statal) law and state law in the degree of centralization
manifested in the making and in the execution of law; thus a primitive
legal system is a relatively decentralized legal system. Decentralization
is characteristic of primitive law because the members of the community at large create law in the form of custom and execute the law
in the form of self-help in the name of the community itself.
Kelsen's synthesis of law raises many questions. One may ask
whether in pre-statal communities the making and execution of law
is as decentralized as Kelsen assumes. For is not the rule of a tribal
chieftain a highly centralized rule-making process? And is it not merely
a figurative expression to assert that decentralization of law-making
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exists because many persons have contributed to the existence of a
custom (such as the vendetta) that has become "law"? Furthermore,
one may ask whether it is not commonly regarded today that law exists
only in those social systems where self-help is an exception to the general
rule. Kelsen argues that the self-help practiced today in the international community may be viewed as comprehended within a legal
system because the rules of international law provide norms which distinguish self-help which -is legal from self-help which is illegal. Thus the
two main categories of self-help in international relations, reprisal and
war, may be either justified by international law or not justified, in which
case they are in themselves international delicts. He admits that his
conception of international law is based on the recognition of the doctrine of bellum justumn, i.e., of distinguishing between just war and
unjust war. In a just war one belligerent functioning as an organ of the
international community, administers the sanction provided by international law upon the nation that commits the delict. In an unjust war
the attacker commits an international delict. However, Kelsen accentuates the fact that the adoption of the bellum justum doctrine is not the
mere result of a scientific consideration but a political decision (p. 54).
Kelsen fails to recognize the historic possibility of a logically inconsistent co-existence of mutually independent concepts of municipal and
international law. However, one may assume that the present confusion
in the conception of international law, including the confused terminology, is a true mirror of the social status of the international community
and that common usage, though logically inconsistent, truly reflects this
inconsistency in conceiving "sovereign" nations as subjected to international law. There is no doubt that this present situation is as unsatisfactory as it is tragic in its consequences.
In the political part of his study and in the conclusion attached to
his lectures, Kelsen admonishes those who are longing for a peaceful
collaboration of nations not to exaggerate the requirement of establishing a strongly centralized international community. Though he regards
a centralized international law-making mechanism and an international
administration as desirable, he -loes not believe that they are attainable
in the near future. International peace, he contends, would be best
served, if we reduce our requirements of an international organization to
the establishment of an international court with jurisdiction embracing
both legal and (so-called) political questions. Kelsen refers to the extremely useful role that courts play in administering and making laws in
the national community. He does not elaborate upon the question that
there is a considerable difference between the institution of courts which
operate subordinated to or side-by-side with established legislative agen-
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cies within a governmental structure and between courts which might
operate as a master wheel of an international government. He does not
differentiate between customary law, as it arises in a legal community
containing the necessary mechanisms to control and to change it, and
between customary international law which arises without a potentially
controlling legislative power.
The political part of Kelsen's study contains a brilliant criticism of
the present technique of international law and of the League of Nations
as it existed until the beginning of the Second World War. He discusses almost all objections actually raised against the recognition of
international law as proper law.
Kelsen's study is characterized by his courage in facing many delicate
problems without applying often used "escape mechanisms." His book,
in which each sentence carries interesting ideas, necessarily leaves a reviewer dissatisfied because the consideration of many important ideas
of the author must be omitted. A proper review of Kelsen's Law and
Peace would require space transcending the volume reviewed.
ERVIN HEXNER.

University of North Carolina,
Political Science Department.
The Rule Against Perpetuities. By John Chipman Gray. Fourth edition, edited by Roland Gray. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1942.
Pp. xcv, 895. $12.50.
For nearly sixty years the monumental work of John Chipman
Gray on The Rule Against Perpetuities has been accepted as standard
and authoritative, not only in the United States but in all parts of the
English-speaking world. Shortly before his death in 1915 Gray sent
to the press the third edition of his work. During the intervening
twenty-seven years (from 1915 to 1942) over 1,300 new cases involving the Rule have been reported and many articles discussing its application have been written. Since the third edition is out of print, the
demand for a modem edition of the work by a competent craftsman
has become urgent. This urgency is readily understandable in light of
the fact that, more than any other rule in the law of property, the Rule
Against Perpetuities constitutes a trap for the unwary grantor, settlor,
or testator--especially one who seeks to attain a sort of immortality
for himself by postponing the ultimate vesting of the interests created
by him too far in the future. Mr. Roland Gray has undertaken the
task of editing the fourth edition of the work of his learned father. An
examination of the book will indicate that he has succeeded admirably
in synthesizing the new material with the old.
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Mr. Gray in his preface to the fourth edition indicates that two
courses were open to him in the preparation of a new edition of a legal
textbook after the author's death: either to keep intact the author's
language and insert, in separate sentences and clauses, the additions and
qualifications necessary to bring the work up to date; or to "proceed as
if he were writing a new book, following the general plan of the earlier
work, but adopting only so much of its language as seems to state
accurately the present law or to indicate the historical development of
the law where he thinks it necessary to show such development." He
chose to steer between these two courses. However, in the arrangement
of materials comprising the subject matter he followed exactly the plan
of Professor Gray.
Where no radical changes in the text were necessary the editor has
reprinted the language of the author and has inserted in the notes new
authorities with appropriate explanatory remarks. Occasionally, however, one finds that the editor has left unchanged remarks of Gray
which today are not sound in the light of modern decisions, and then
has made modifying statements in the footnotes indicating that the law
is contrary to the textual statement.1 This tends to be confusing to the
reader. It is suggested that, in such cases, it would have been better
had the editor rewritten the text on the basis of the present law.
In general, however, where the editor was convinced that Gray's
statements, in the light of developing authority and recent discussions,
did not state the existing law, he has completely rewritten several sections and has inserted new material pertinent thereto. The important
subject matter thus revised is as follows: Sections 39-41, on possibilities
of reverter in the United States; sections 259-267, on Conflict of Laws;
sections 487-509.18, on powers of sale; sections 541-561.7, on election
with respect to appointments under powers; and sections 753-772, on
Foreign Law.2 Appendix H, sections 894-909, on gifts for noncharitable purposes has also been rewritten. Appendix N, sections
975-977, is entirely new. In this appendix the editor takes issue with
Professor Vance as to the construction of the Statute Quia Emptores
regarding the possibility of subinfeudation after the statute's passage.
Fortunately for the reader, the editor has not attempted to distinguish the new material from the old by any system of marks.
As a result of the editing process the new edition consists of 833
pages as contrasted with the third edition which contained 663 pages.
The new edition is printed in somewhat larger and more readable type
than the old. The footnotes have been greatly expanded by the in' See page 47 and footnote 2 in connection with the discussion of possibilities
of reverter.
I The section numbers referred to are as they appear in the fourth edition.
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clusion of many new cases and have been enriched by citations to law
review comments and articles, and by references to the Restatement of
Property. Instead of numbering consecutively all of the footnote references as they appear in each page of the text, the editor has departed
from that method (which was employed in the third edition), and has
numbered the footnotes according to sections, repeating the number of
the section in the footnotes. This latter method is somewhat confusing
to the reader, especially if three footnotes numbered "1," or two sets
of footnotes, "1" and "2," appear at the bottom of the same page. One
more minor criticism. Although it would have added considerably to
the mechanical task of the editor to include the dates of the cases cited,
in this reviewer's opinion the documentation would have been more
complete and serviceable had this been done.
Professor Gray's master work has not suffered at the hands of a
new editor. The editor of the fourth edition has done a thorough and
scholarly job in revising and bringing up to date a most complicated
and difficult subject. This new edition of The Rule Against Perpetuities
will receive a hearty welcome from the entire legal profession.
FRED B. MCCALL.

Chapel Hill, N. C.
The Judicial Function in Federal Administrative Agencies. By Joseph
P. Chamberlain, Noel T. Dowling, and Paul R. Hays. New York:
The Commonwealth Fund. 1942. Pp. xii, 258.
The clue to just what kind of book this is lies in the preface.
Therein it appears that this modest-sized book of 234 pages is the work
of three authors and a staff of ten persons. It further appears in the
foreword that the work was under the auspices of a committee of the
Commonwealth Fund. A number of federal administrative agencies
were selected and studied. One deduces that the procedure was to
decide what to study, set up a staff, gather a considerable quantity of
information, arrange it somehow, and present it in a book. The
strengths and weaknesses of the book reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the method.
In the first place the study was confined to certain material, notwithstanding the fact that much additional available material beyond
that studied has a bearing upon the ideas advanced and subjects discussed in the book. The result is that parts of the discussion are
sketchy and incomplete. For example, when the- authors consider the
question whether administrative agencies may base decisions on evidence not duly introduced as such' they are treating a problem by no.
Ip. 34.
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means confined to their selected group of federal administrative agencies, but rather a problem common to administrative agencies in general.
Because their materials were limited their treatment touches only the
surface of this important matter. Thorough discussions of it are available,2 but these were not cited; neither was any indication given that a
movement is on foot by legislation to enable commissions after a hearing is had to use the wealth of data at their disposal, though not introduced in evidence at the hearing, provided the party affected is thereafter
given an opportunity to rebut the additional matter thus taken into
account.3 Again, the authors state,4 "These informal procedures of
settling and adjusting differences are generally not appropriate in those
situations in which the agency is performing a legislative function, as
in rate making. . . ." Some eyebrows may be politely lifted at this
positive declaration that rate-making is a legislative function,6 but
whether it is or not the reviewer 'doubts the accuracy of the assertion
that informal adjustment is generally not appropriate in making rates.
Certain it is that outside the boundaries of the rather narrow segment
of the administrative field here chosen for study, much rate fixing is
done by informal negotiation. 6 In situations where reduction in the
whole level of rates of a public utility appears desirable, but formal
rate hearings would make it necessary to produce at prohibitive expense
the complicated data necessary legally to justify the reductions, it is
hard to see why the result should not be accomplished by informal
negotiation. The interests of the utility are protected, for after all it
may refuse to consent; the rate payers stand to gain, for if the result
is not achieved by negotiation it may not be achieved at all.
I
When the authors- do make an excursion into state administrative
law for the light it may shed on some subject they are discussing the
light shed may not be strong enough to enable the reader to see very
well, due to the fact that the state materials have not been made the
subject of any complete research. Thus it is said that state statutes
"giving administrative agencies the power to imprison have been held
unconstitutional as encroaching upon the judicial power. ' 7 No mention
is made of a far-reaching state decision going away beyond the idea
-'For example, Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 364, 410.
'A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1941 (1941) 19 N. C.
L. REv. 435, 437, especially the material there cited.
'P. 13.
People ex rel. Central Park, N. & E. R. R. R. v. Willcox, 194 N. Y. 383,
87 N. E. 517 (1909); FREUND, ADMINISTRATVE PowERs OVER PERSONS AND
PROPERTY (1928) 15.
'Examples: In the Matter of, the Rates of the Carolina Power & Light Co.,
N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1933-34, 20; in the Matter of the Rates of the Duke
Power Co. and Southern Pub. Utilities Co., N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1933-34, 33.

'P. 97, n. 33.
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that a statut could constitutionally confer such power, to hold that the
power to imprison for contempt is inherent in an administrative agency
when performing duties judicial in nature, even though the statute
failed to grant such power. 8
One of the consequences of this kind of study of selected materials is
likely to be a presentation of the materials as if they were all of the
same weight, without regard for obsolescence. A field developing as
fast as administrative law passes quickly through stages of development, and cases and other materials belonging to a stage already passed
should not be placed on a par with current materials. The proposal
of a committee of the American Bar Association that the judicial powers of federal administrative agencies be severed from them and transferred to an administrative court is set forth in the book and then
demolished.9 This is hardly necessary; the proposal represented a mere
transitory stage in the development of the viewpoint of the Bar Association. It is now superseded by the view that abuses of judicial power
should be eliminated by providing adequate safeguards, 0° rather than
by attempting to dismember the administrative tribunals.
Notwithstanding deficiencies in this study arising from: the fact that
it appears to be a planned project rather than the product of matured
experience or long continued study and observation, still the book has
its contribution to make. For one thing it is illumined throughout by
the thoughtful opinions and conclusions of its authors. Although many
of the views presented are already familiar, the book is nevertheless
valuable as another independent confirmation of criticism directed to the
workings of administrative agencies; thus it adds to the current of unbiased opinion on a subject where such opinion is especially important,
since administrative control is still in the formative stage. Among noteworthy suggestions the reviewer found particularly intriguing the proposal that a subcommittee of Congress be charged with the duty of
keeping in contact with each administrative agency." By such continuous contact Congress would have at its disposal ready knowledge
of any agency's affairs, and a clearinghouse for complaints about or
requests by each agency.
The treatment by the authors of the various subjects within the
scope of their title varies greatly in emphasis. Some subjects, such as
evidence before administrative tribunals, are passed over rapidly,
whereas others receive full and detailed examination. Probably the
principal contribution is the thorough discussion of the sanctions em8In re Hayes, 200 N. C. 133, 156 S. E. 791 (1931).
90P. 212.
" Report of the Committee on Administrative Agencies and Tribunal; (1939)
64 A. B. A. Rnu. 407, 431; Report of the Special Committee on Administrative
21 P. 231.
Law (1939) 64 A. B. A. REP. 575.
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ployed by administrative agencies. One of the revolutionary changes
introduced into the legal system by the mushroom growth of administrative agencies lies in the great variety of means whereby they can
bring about compliance with their rules and orders, or even their dcesires. This detailed study of such sanctions is timely. The book also
displays proper emphasis on the policies of administrative agencies. By
reason of this much greater emphasis on some portions of the subject
perhaps the book should have been entitled "Some Observations on the
Judicial Function in Federal Administrative Agencies."
Probably what has already been stated shows that this is no reference book wherein to find the law on the subject announced. It is
a study of a new phase of the legal order, not a -digest of cases and
statutes. It is for the reader who seeks to understand a development,
not for the lawyer who is looking for some law on a point.
The reviewer thinks that the best books are those written by men
with wide experience or knowledge in a particular field who write under
the urge of a strong and growing feeling that there are things which
need to be said. But this book proves that a project, a deliberately
planned undertaking to study something and write about it, may still
be worth while.
FRANK HANFr.

Chapel Hill, N. C.

